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Note
China's New Anti-Monopoly Law:
Addressing Foreign Competitors and
Commentators
Richard Student*
Chinese lawmakers made news with the passage of China's
first comprehensive antitrust law, known as the Anti-Monopoly
Law (AML),' scheduled to take effect on August 1, 2008. While
the AML is a milestone in Chinese economic policy, its
substance has been particularly newsworthy for alleged
weaknesses which may have a negative impact on foreign firms
and investors doing business in China. The Chinese
government, however, is legitimately concerned about the
negative effects that foreign activity may have on local interests
if the activities of foreign entities operating within the country
are unchecked. Thus, China's dilemma lies in phrasing and
interpreting the provisions of the AML to strike the right
balance between fostering its domestic firms while avoiding
imposing undesirable consequences on domestic activity by
foreign firms and investors.
Specifically, this Note seeks to determine the optimal
administrative policy in implementing the AML that would
. J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., Miami
University, 2006. The author thanks his family, friends, undergraduate professors,
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1. Fan Longduan Fa [Anti-Monopoly Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) (P.R.C.), available
at http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-08/30/content732591.htm, translated at
http://fortunelegalpad.files.wordpress.com/2007/09/anti-monopoly-law-translated-by-
td-2007-8-31.doc (unofficial English translation courtesty of T&D Associates).
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allow China's domestic firms to compete effectively with their
foreign counterparts in China. Part I of this Note outlines the
unique economic history of China and its impact on the ability of
present day Chinese firms to compete with firms that evolved in
different economic environments. Part I also describes some of
the major points of the AML and highlights certain criticisms
made by Western commentators. Part II consists of a
comparative analysis of the circumstances that exist in China
warranting the concern on the part of Chinese lawmakers
regarding foreign competition in China, followed by evidence of
such concern in the provisions of the AML and a reply to the
Western critics. This Note closes with a pragmatic proposal in
Part III to address China's dilemma, with the aim of recognizing
and accommodating all interests involved: Chinese firms,
foreign firms, and Chinese consumers.
I. BACKGROUND
A. A COMPARATIVE SKETCH OF THE U.S. AND CHINESE
ECONOMIES
1. China's Current Market Structure
To fully understand the current state of the Chinese
market, it is first necessary to examine the historical experience
which continues to shape the state of its economy. Since 1978,
China's economic policy has shifted "pragmatically" from a
centrally planned, Marxist-Leninist model,2 to one in which
competitive markets have evolved to a limited extent.3 Before
the Maoist era, China did not have an extensive commercial
economy or the corresponding legal structures.' In Maoist
China, industries were centrally planned and developed. In the
farming sector, for example, individual farmers were organized
into communes5 which were directed what to grow, how much to
2. Bruce M. Owen et al., Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive
Compatibility, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 123, 124 (2005) (describing the model as
the "Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Model," placing Chairman Mao Zedong and his
political revolution alongside the original communists and their revolution which
took place decades earlier).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 126.
5. Id. (explaining that farms were first organized as cooperatives until 1958,
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grow, and were paid a set price by a central planning agency.
Similar central planning occurred in the industrial sector, where
the focus was on heavy industry.7 This system was equally
wasteful.'
Reform began in 1978 in the rural regions, where the
commune system had obviously failed.9  In 1992, reform
accelerated quickly under the initiative of Deng Xiaoping. To
date, the reform has been a boon to the Chinese population,
which has seen its standard of living rise by more than a factor
of ten."1
China is a transitional economy, a term used to refer to an
economy transitioning from a socialist, planned system to a
market-based system. 2 It shares this classification with other
countries such as Vietnam and the former Soviet states. 3
However, China's economy is unique even relative to many
other transitional economies. 4 Unlike Poland, which was left
with an economy characterized by high industrial concentration
(a common legacy of the command structure), 5 industrial
concentration in China differed in two respects. First, the
geographic concentration of industry across China was, and still
is, evenly distributed. 6 Second, concentration within a given
industry is relatively low. 7 Both of these phenomena are due in
part to previous central planning policy decisions favoring local
self-sufficiency and the corresponding regional separation of
when they began to be organized into communes).
6. Id. (explaining that because the market price mechanism was not in place
to ensure efficiency, and because the farmers had little incentive to work hard, this
system did not work well, as evidenced by the millions of Chinese who subsequently
died from starvation).
7. Id. at 126-27.
8. Id. at 127.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 128. This followed Xiaoping's "inspection tour" of the southern
regions and the official declaration of the 14th Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party that the central goal of economic reform was to establish a "socialist market
economy." Id.
11. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: CHINA (Feb. 7, 2008),
https://www.cia.govllibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.
12. See, e.g., Bing Song, Competition Policy in a Transitional Economy: The
Case of China, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 387, 388 (1995).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., id. at 394-95 (discussing the nature of the Polish experience).
15. Id. at 394.
16. Id. at 396. This distribution is due, in part, to the fact that China has not
taken advantage of the benefits of regional specialization. Id.
17. Id. at 397.
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industry.'8 The inefficiencies of this market structure include a
lack of regional specialization'9 as well as repetitive investments
at low levels.2"
In comparison to China, industrial and geographical
concentration levels are significantly higher in other national
economies-both transitional and developed-including the
United States.2' The Chinese motor vehicle and machine tool
manufacturing industries, for example, are representative of
Chinese industry as a whole,22 and illustrate this international
contrast. In the Chinese motor vehicle industry, more than 110
Chinese manufacturers each produce less than 10,000 units, a
relatively small output next to many American manufacturers,
such as Saturn (a division of GM), which is slated to produce at
least 200,000 cars per year.23 The nations' respective machine
tool manufacturing industries exhibit the same pattern, with
the top five American firms accounting for sixty-nine percent of
U.S. production, compared to China where the top five firms
account for only twenty percent of production.24
2. Emergence of Both Capitalist Economies on the Timeline of
Globalization
Another important difference between the U.S. and Chinese
economies is the point at which each capitalist economy began
its development with respect to the timeline of economic
globalization. The Chinese economy underwent state-controlled
development until 1978.25 Thereafter it began to have contact
with a world economy that was more globalized, in terms of
transportation and communication technologies, than the
18. Id. at 395. This regional separation has only been exacerbated recently due
to the emphasis on local economic development since 1979. Id. The policy reasoning
behind the geographic partition of the Chinese economy was due in part to Mao's
military strategy of regional self-sufficiency, so in the event of foreign invasion, each
region could continue autonomously. Mark Williams, Wal-Mart in China: Will the
Regulatory System Ensnare the American Leviathan?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1361, 1365
(2007).
19. Song, supra note 12, at 396.
20. Owen, supra note 2, at 132.
21. As Poland began transition in 1989, it had to deal with a highly
concentrated economy, a remnant of its old command structure. Song, supra note
12, at 394. The market economy of Japan is likewise characterized by levels of
industrial concentration which significantly exceed those in China. Id. at 397.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Owen, supra note 2, at 126.
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economy which existed when the competitive marketplace of the
United States first began to develop over two centuries ago.
In December 2001, China joined the World Trade
Organization (WTO), agreeing to follow the WTO's rules and
lower trade barriers. 6 This meant "more foreign competition
pressuring China's most vulnerable industries, such as the
country's steel smelters, coal producers and 120 carmakers."27
Chinese industries dealing in "immaterial products" are also
vulnerable to competition in a world of instant and low-cost
communication technology.28
Presently, the Chinese economy has been opened up to a
world economy in the midst of the "third industrial revolution,"
the current shift toward knowledge-based economies. 9 With
today's communication and transportation technologies,
multinational corporations increasingly search the globe for the
most profitable places to produce and sell their goods.3" It is
within this context of knowledge-based, global economic activity
that the Chinese free market is being established.
The United States, however, was born-and witnessed its
own discrete economy begin to emerge independent of
Britain's-during what has been coined as the "first industrial
revolution."3  This first revolution began in Britain,32 but the
technologies developed there were quickly diffused into the
26. Toby D. Merchant, Recognizing ILO Rights to Organize and Bargain
Collectively; Grease in China's Transition to a Socialist Market, 36 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 223, 228 (2004).
27. Id. (citing Matthew Forney, Workers' Wasteland, TIME ASIA, Nov. 1, 2002,
available at http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/1101020617/cover.html).
28. Edward E. Leamer & Michael Storper, The Economic Geography of the
Internet Age, 32 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 641, 642 (2001) (offering examples of such
"immaterial products" including the intellectual and information-based products in
the areas of accountancy, finance, marketing, and legal work.). For a noteworthy
examination of legal outsourcing, see generally Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing
and the Globalizing Legal Profession, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2189 (2007).
29. Lester C. Thurow, Globalization: The Product of a Knowledge-Based
Economy, 570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 19, 20 (2000). The first and
second industrial revolutions were the steam- and electricity-driven revolutions,
respectively. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Nicholas F.R. Crafts, The First Industrial Revolution: A Guided Tour
for Growth Economists, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 197, 197 (1996) (citing Thomas Ashton's
original coinage of the phrase "first industrial revolution"). This first industrial
revolution is characterized by the important technological changes that occurred
between 1760 and 1830. Id. at 197-98.
32. See generally Nicholas F.R. Crafts, Industrial Revolution in England and
France: Some Thoughts on the Question, "Why was England First?", 30 ECON. HIST.
REV. 429 (1977).
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economies of Western Europe and the United States.33 The
principal factors behind this rapid diffusion appear to have been
market orientation and accessibility to Britain.34
B. OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST POLICY IN CHINA
AND THE UNITED STATES
1. China
Prior to the passage of the AML, Chinese legislation only
partially dealt with anti-competitive practices related to market
conduct.35 The main example of such legislation was the Act
Against Unfair Competition, passed by the National People's
Congress in 1993.36 Despite its name, the Act barely touched
upon monopoly and cartel activities;37 it focused instead on
narrowly defining such anti-competitive practices as false
advertising, unauthorized use of trademarks, and the theft of
commercial secrets.3" The Chinese legislature explained the
absence of traditional Western antitrust regulations, such as
those on monopoly, merger, and cartel activity, by claiming that
other Chinese laws such as the Product Quality Act and the
Consumer Protection Act adequately protected consumer
interests.39 These acts, however, are primarily product liability
laws, not antitrust laws. 4 Between 1993 and the recent passage
of its AML, China made a few minor additions to this antitrust
regulatory scheme, although the sum of these other acts and the
1993 Act Against Unfair Competition did not add up to the
comprehensive schemes in place in countries with more
experience with antitrust issues," such as the United States.
33. Rondo Cameron, The Diffusion of Technology as a Problem in Economic
History, 51 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 217, 221 (1975).
34. Id. Specifically, diffusion was fostered by American merchants and other
entrepreneurs with frequent contact to the British markets. Id.
35. Song, supra note 12, at 412.
36. Agencies of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce began
working on the Act in 1987, followed by a lengthy period of drafting, before the final
version was passed in 1993. Id. at 413.
37. In the legal context of the United States, these sorts of activities are
synonymous with "unfair competition."
38. Song, supra note 12, at 412.
39. Id. at 414.
40. Id.
41. Such legislative actions include: the Commercial Banking Law of 1995
(which forbids banks from taking part in "improper conduct"); the Provisional Rules
for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (which
[Vol. 17:2
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2. United States
The United States has two key pieces of federal antitrust
legislation in place. Prior to 1890, the United States had an
antitrust common law tradition inherited from England, and
this body of law addressed familiar issues such as monopoly
power and restraints on trade." The Sherman Act of 1890"3
borrowed much of the language and rules of the common law,
codifying the illegality of monopolies and contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade." The
Clayton Act of 1914"5 is the other major piece of Federal
antitrust legislation in the United States, which serves in large
part to clarify and supplement the Sherman Act.'
A large body of case law has been developed interpreting
and applying the provisions of these two acts, especially on the
subjects of combinations among competitors, monopoly power,
and merger activity.47 Explicit cartel activity among competitors
has been essentially eliminated from U.S. markets via Section 1
of the Sherman Act. 8 Similar success has been achieved via the
Sherman and Clayton Acts in regards to monopoly and merger
activities. The relatively brief statutes, especially the Sherman
Act, are notably general and broad-reaching, and have given the
courts a significant role in the development of the law. Also
notable are the effective enforcement procedures in place.
Actions may be brought by the Federal Trade Commission, the
Department of Justice, or private parties," and offenders may
be subject to criminal penalties or treble damages."
apply only to foreign companies); and the provisional Rules for Prevention of
Monopoly Pricing (which leave key definitions and prohibitions overly vague).
Owen, supra note 2, at 139-40.
42. PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 32-33 (6th ed. 2004).
43. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(2004)).
44. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 42, at 35.
45. Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(2002)).
46. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 42, at 44. Unlike violations of the Clayton
Act, violations of the Sherman Act are considered criminal acts and are punishable
by imprisonment. Id. at 45.
47. See generally id.
48. Id. at 113.
49. Id. at 3.
50. Id. at 46-58.
51. Id.
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C. CHINA'S 2007 ANTI-MONOPoLY LAW
1. Description and Comparison with the Sherman Act
On August 31, 2007, the National People's Congress passed
the AML, after it was pending in one form or another for
thirteen years. 2 The law is set to take effect on August 1,
2008."3 A main motive for the legislation had been the high rate
of foreign acquisition of Chinese firms (including state-owned
enterprises), which had raised concerns in China about its
economic security. 4
The main provisions of the AML run roughly parallel to the
main provisions of the Sherman Act. Chapter 2 of the AML
(Prohibition of Monopolistic Agreements) is analogous to Section
1 of the Sherman Act.5 Both prohibit, in general terms, firms
from taking part in coordinated activities aimed at, or that
result in, the elimination or restriction of competition. 6 One
notable caveat in Chapter 2 of the AML is Article 11,
authorizing a competent anti-monopoly authority to approve
exemptions from Article 8 if certain agreements among the
operators are beneficial to "the development of the national
economy and the social and public interests."57
52. Keith Bradsher, World Business Briefing; China: Antimonopoly Law
Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9502E 3DC 1531F932A0575BCOA9619C8B63.
53. Id.
54. China Passes New Anti-Trust Law, RTT NEWS, Aug. 30, 2007, available at
http://www.rttnews.com/sp/todaystop.asp?date=08/30/2007&item=40&vid=O; see also
Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 59 (2006)
("[A]t the annual meeting of the Chinese retailers' association in February 2004,
participants expressed their 'widespread anger . . . at the speed foreign companies
have gained market share, through legal and illegal means."'). One aspect of the
Anti-Monopoly Law is especially worth mentioning. Previously, only mergers and
acquisitions worth more than $100 million needed Ministry of Commerce approval.
Now, foreign investors will need to apply for approvals from the Ministry if their
purchases of domestic companies affect national economic security, take place in key
sectors, or cause a transfer of the operating rights of famous domestic brands.
China Passes New Anti-Trust Law, supra.
55. H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Kathy Lijun Yang, China: Latest Developments in
Anti-Monopoly Law Legislation, 19 ANTITRUST 89, 91 (2005).
56. Chapter 2 of AML Article 8 prohibits "coordinated activities which intend to
eliminate or restrict competition or in fact have the effect of eliminating or
restricting competition." Id. The Sherman Act declares illegal "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
57. Harris & Yang, supra note 55, at 91-92 (listing the specific exemptions,
[Vol. 17:2
CHINA'S NEW ANTI-MONOPOL Y LAW
Like Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Chapter 3 of the AML
(Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position) prohibits
anti-competitive use of monopoly power. 8  An important
difference between the Chinese and American versions of this
area of antitrust regulation is in the level of market share that
must be commanded by a firm in order to trigger a presumption
of monopoly power. U.S. courts have traditionally set that
threshold at seventy percent of the relevant market (and only
very rarely below fifty percent), while Chapter 3 of the AML
triggers the monopoly presumption at eleven percent. 9
2. Recommendations for and Criticisms of the AML
In 2005 the Antitrust Law and International Law and
Practice Sections of the American Bar Association submitted
comments on the 2005 Revised Draft of the AML.6" The
recommendations included de-emphasizing the national
economy and the public good as the interests to be protected,
and a refocus on the protection of consumer welfare as the policy
goal behind the AML.6" The comments also suggested
deemphasizing any non-competition related considerations
which allow "adapt[ing] to economic distress," joint activities by small and medium
sized firms aimed at improving efficiency and competitiveness, and "other activities.
. . that are beneficial to the development of the national economy and the social and
public interests").
58. Id. at 92.
59. Id. This low market share requirement reflects a rule already observed by
Chinese courts: in January of 2007, a Shanghai court heard evidence in a case
brought against Sony by a Chinese company, despite the fact that Sony only had a
twenty-percent market share of the digital camera market. Roger Parloff, Sony's
China Problem: Will a Lawsuit Against Sony in China Set a Scary Precedent?,
FORTUNE, Feb. 22, 2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazineslfortune/
fortune-archive/2007/03/05/8401275/index.htm.
60. JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S SECTIONS OF
ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE
PROPOSED ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (2005)
[hereinafter ABA Comments 2], available at http://www.abanet.orglintlaw
committees/businessregulationlantitrust/chinacommentsantimonopoly.pdf. The
May 2005 Joint Comments are intended to supplement the July 2003 Joint
Comments. Id.; see also JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S
SECTIONS OF ANTITRUST LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE ON THE
PROPOSED ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2003)
[hereinafter ABA Comments 1], available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/
committees/business-regulationantitrust/chinacommentsantimonopoly.pdf (as
appendix starting at page 45 of the file).
61. Id. at 2 (noting that promoting the welfare of the "national economy" and
the "public interest" are worthy goals, but inappropriate for an antitrust regulatory
scheme).
2008]
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when reviewing mergers and acquisitions, including foreign
acquisitions of domestic firms.62
Commentators have also focused on how the AML should
treat the administrative monopolies in China.6 3 The 2004 draft
of the AML included a chapter' specifically prohibiting
administrative monopolies, a prohibition lauded by Professor
Stephen Harris as potentially an "extremely important tool in
the establishment of a free competition regime in China."65
Professor Harris has since expressed concern toward the
reduction (in 2005) of this chapter to a single, general provision
of "limited practical value,"' although he did note that in the
2006 draft of the AML, certain protective provisions against
administrative monopolies which had previously been removed
were reintroduced.67
II. ANALYSIS
A. Two ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS
The thesis of this Note relies on the reasoning set forth in
Part II.B below, as well as two general economic presumptions
noted here.
The first assumption is that free international trade is
generally economically beneficial, and protectionist measures
are likewise economically harmful. Academic commentators
and passive viewers of CNN alike can note a definite discontent
with, if not a proper rejection of, this claim.68  However, most
62. Id. at 5.
63. The Chinese Administrative Monopoly is the phenomenon of state-owned
monopolistic enterprises, which often have the incentive to abuse their local
monopoly power in order to extract direct profits from the enterprises as well as to
levy taxes on those profits. Williams, supra note 18, at 1365.
64. Harris & Yang, supra note 55, at 93 (The chapter was "Chapter 5:
Prohibition of Administrative Monopoly.").
65. Id.
66. H. Stephen Harris, Jr., Recent Developments in Asia, 21 ANTITRUST 79, 80
(2006).
67. Id. at 80. Harris nevertheless expresses doubts as to the effectiveness of
the provisions, given the lack of clarity in the AML as to the ability of private parties
to directly enforce the provisions against local administrative abuse. Id. at 81.
68. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Free Trade: Old and New Challenges, 104
ECON. J. 231, 232 (1994) (noting that fear has grown in developed countries, and
certainly the United States, that free trade with developing countries will drive
down the wages of domestic unskilled labor); Lou Dobbs Tonight (CNN, broadcasting
nightly at 7 p.m. ET) (news program that routinely portrays American free trade
[Vol. 17:2
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economists believe that free trade is likely to improve the
affected population's economic welfare.69
One relevant aspect in which free trade is economically
beneficial is its effect on innovation. It is generally accepted
that technological innovation can be discouraged by
protectionist policies because such protection increases a
domestic firm's profits, which would otherwise be enjoyed by a
more efficient foreign firm; while at the same time creating a
disincentive to invest in new technologies to compete with the
more efficient foreign firm.7° This is the general rule, although
the benefits to domestic innovation which may stem from
protectionist measures in certain contexts are legitimately
debatable.7' Nevertheless, the idea that national protectionist
policies generally tend to hinder innovation will be presumed,
along with the broader proposition that such policies tend to
have a negative effect on a given economy.
The second assumption at work in this analysis is that
domestic consolidation of separate business entities is less of an
antitrust concern where the marketplace of buyers and sellers is
larger than the national economy, and thus more firms, foreign
and domestic, are in competition with each other. This
assumption follows from the antitrust principle that market
concentration is a significant indicator of the likely
anticompetitive effect of a merger. Indeed, such domestic
consolidation in the face of foreign competition, rather than
raising antitrust concerns, can promote efficiency as the
resultant consolidated enterprise can close inefficient plants,
eliminate redundancy, and combine the complementary
policies in a negative light).
69. Larry Karp, Sandeep Sacheti & Jinhua Zhao, Common Ground Between
Free-Traders and Environmentalists, 42 INT'L ECON. REV. 617, 617 (2001)
(considering the negative environmental effects which may result from open
international trade).
70. Kaz Miyagiwa & Yuka Ohno, Credibility of Protection and Incentives to
Innovate, 40 INT'L ECON. REV. 143, 143 (1999).
71. Id. at 143, 160 (arguing that temporary protection can be an effective
stimulant of innovation, in the context of infant industries, for example, if the
domestic firm believes, first, that the protection will not be removed early should
innovation take place before the initial terminal date of the protection, and second,
that the protection will not be renewed after termination should no innovation
occur).
72. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 42, at 712 (citing the Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which set forth an
interval schedule of hypothetical post-merger market concentrations and the
corresponding administrative review each interval will receive).
2008]
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advantages of the former separate entities. 3
The logic of this second assumption speaks not only to
domestic merger activity, but also to domestic cartel activity,
that classic antitrust example of an "arrangement in restraint of
trade."4 In a global marketplace, the "malevolent cartels that
are so worrisome to free marketers can seldom withstand the
winds of international competition."75  Although there is good
reason to be suspicious of cartel activity based on past bad
behavior,76 this activity can provide economic benefits by way of
consolidation and "pooling" of assets and efforts, much the same
way merger activity can.
B. WHY CONCERN ON THE PART OF CHINESE POLICYMAKERS IS
JUSTIFIED
1. Globalization Aspect
One of two chief reasons that China's concerns for its
economy are justified, as the nation continues to develop a
market economy, is China's place in relation to the modern
global economy. In absolute terms, China's market economy is
emerging in a world where transportation and communication
costs are lower than ever before.77 This presents a special
competitive challenge to Chinese firms dealing in immaterial
products and services, as the distances between supply and
demand become more irrelevant and less of an added cost. 8 The
economic advantages and insulation that physical distance
provided in the past are disappearing, and if a Chinese client
73. Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Problems of Adjustment in Distressed
Industries, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 21, 24 (1986).
74. Joseph L. Bower & Eric A. Rhenman, Benevolent Cartels, HARV. Bus. REV.,
July-Aug. 1985, at 124, 124.
75. Id. at 130.
76. Reasons for the bad reputation of the cartel include: in most democracies,
cartels have been used to unfairly exploit nonmembers that are deliberately
excluded; the natural propensity, noted by economist Adam Smith, for people of the
same trade to "conspir[e] against the public" or form some agreement to raise prices
where possible. Id. at 126.
77. See Leamer & Storper, supra note 28, at 642.
78. Id. Thus the intellectual activities that comprise immaterial products and
services are "amenable to procurement at a distance: the design in Detroit,
advertising in New York and strategy in Chicago." Id. Of course, equally possible,
given instant communication technology and multinational corporations, is a
business plan involving design in the Beijing, advertising in the Tokyo, and strategy
in Chicago.
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can just as easily acquire the services of an American
investment bank as it can a Chinese investment bank, the
Chinese investment bank will have to compete directly with its
American counterpart.
This challenge is not limited to the immaterial services
sector. Decreasing transportation and communications costs
aside, China is opening up its markets at a moment in history
when the ever-integrating world economy spares little time
before entering a fresh market to do business. And what better
place to set up shop than in the midst of more than 1.3 billion
potential shoppers?79 China's entry into the the WTO in 200180
and acceptance of the WTO's attendant rules,' coupled with the
fact that China's population is gaining affluence and
maintaining a stronger middle-class base,82 raised the lure of
doing business in China to new levels. This lure has enticed
foreign entrepreneurs seeking to invest in China by, among
other methods, establishing foreign-brand chain stores and
offering plenty of material goods and services to compete with
those of Chinese companies. 3
The rise of the multinational corporation has undoubtedly
been a driving force behind the modern" trend of globalization.
The relationship between the multinational corporation and the
process of globalization is self-reinforcing. Such conglomerates
are nurtured by the growing integration of world product and
capital markets, and in turn, contribute further to the growth of
those markets." The business conducted by such firms has
79. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 11 (estimating the population of
China as of July 2007 to be 1,321,851,888).
80. Merchant, supra note 26, at 228.
81. Id. Such rules have done much to alleviate fears of foreign enterprise
investors. Michele Lee, Franchising in China: Legal Challenges when First Entering
the Chinese Market, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 949, 952 (2004).
82. Lee, supra note 81, at 951.
83. Id. (noting that the China Chainstore and Franchise Association predicts
that franchising will comprise over thirty percent of retail sales by 2010). Lee also
notes that the entrance into the Chinese market is as much a pull from within
China, as a push from, in the case of American businesses, the U.S.-brand-saturated
markets of the United States. Id.
84. "The multinational corporation .. .is neither a new development in the
world economy nor an unknown phenomenon in economic history, but its effect on
the international economic system is truly revolutionary." Lawrence B. Krause, The
International Economic System and the Multinational Corporation, 403 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 93, 93 (1972).
85. Id. Writing in 1972, Professor Krause noted the need then, to say nothing
of the need now, of policies which can "ensure a competitive environment and to
reconcile the activity of multinational corporations with national interests and
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increased significantly in the past half century. For example,
between 1950 and 1970, U.S. direct investment abroad
increased from $11.8 billion to $78.1 billion, a sevenfold
increase, while corporate investment within the United States
increased by less than fivefold over the same time period.86 This
data indicates the early days of a shift toward an international
market and away from a relatively self-contained national
economy. There is no doubt that domestic firms in China,
especially in vulnerable industries, struggle to compete with
recently arriving multinationals." One can only imagine the
issues China's 120 domestic automakers5 must address in
competing with the likes of Toyota, which has created enormous
difficulties for even well-established U.S. automakers. 9
In addition to China's place in the world economy as
measured against an absolute historical timescale, globalization
presents difficulties that are largely unique to China, and that
are best understood in relative terms. Not only is China's infant
market economy developing at a later stage of globalization
than the infant market economy of the United States developed,
but relative to its own place on that timescale, China's economy
is less equipped than the U.S. economy was to face the
competition that existed in its own respective historical setting.
The economy of the new United States was an extension
and transplant of the economy of Great Britain and Western
Europe. The "first industrial revolution" was born in Britain,
but the technological advances made there spread quickly to the
rest of Western Europe and the United States?' Thus, any lag
in technology between Britain and the United States did not
amount to such an advantage for Britain that international
American firms were left significantly less able to compete with
their British counterparts. 9' While the first industrial
welfare." Id.
86. Id. at 95.
87. See, e.g., Youngjin Jung & Qian Hao, The New Economic Constitution in
China: A Third Way for Competition Regime?, 24 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 107, 120-23
(2003).
88. Merchant, supra note 26, at 228.
89. America's Car Industry: Shape up or Ship out, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2003,
available at http://www.economist.comlbusiness/globalexecutive/reading/
displayStory.cfm?story-id=2119229 (noting that General Motors, which commanded
sixty percent of the auto market in 1960, now has less than half of that, and in
August of 2003, Toyota outsold Chrysler for the first time in the American market).
90. Cameron, supra note 33, at 220-21.
91. As professor Krause notes, multinational corporations are nothing terribly
new. As one author notes, "The start of this institution can be traced back more
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revolution92 left the British economy as the dominant force in
the world economy by the mid to late nineteenth century,93 little
time passed before Britain began to feel the pressure from
foreign competition-originating mostly from continental
Europe and the United States94 -as these foreign economies
quickly absorbed British technological advances, and in turn
initiated advances of their own. 5 This ability of U.S. firms to
compete with British firms was due to the market orientation of
the U.S. economy as well as the accessibility to U.S. firms of the
British marketplace. 6
Turning to China's relative place in today's international
economy, it is clear that the ease of foreign technological
integration which kept the United States on an even playing
field since the beginning with the British hegemony does not
characterize prior Chinese experience, due to both the past
market orientation of the Chinese economy as well as the past
lack of accessibility to foreign economic activity. Under the
central planning system which dominated the economy until
1978, and which continues to exert significant,97  albeit
decreasing, control over the Chinese marketplace, the natural
economic incentives to innovate or adopt foreign innovations
were lacking. 8 True, the Chinese government did attempt to
modernize quickly, beginning with its first five year plan in
than a hundred years: the first foreign factory of the Singer Sewing Machine
Company, for example, was established in 1867. By World War I, several companies
like General Electric, Ford, and Unilever had substantial international
manufacturing organizations." John Fayerweather, The Internationalizaton of
Business, 403 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 1, 2 (1972).
92. This revolution included, among other things, "seven decades of intense
capital investment in productive capacity" (i.e., technological innovation). Bernard
Elbaum & William Lazonick, The Decline of the British Economy: An Institutional
Perspective, 44 J. ECON. HIST. 567, 569 (1984).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 571.
95. The efficient corporate methods of mass production being developed at the
time in Germany, Japan, and the United States were the product of innovation in
the areas of industrial relations, industrial organization, and enterprise
management. Id.
96. Id.
97. "According to a national census, among [three) million enterprises that
existed on December 31, 2001, [state-owned enterprises] and enterprises with a
controlling share held by the State accounted for 56.2% in capital and 49.6% in
annual revenue." Owen, supra note 2, at 128.
98. Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall
1998, at 133, 135 (explaining that "private ownership is the crucial source of
incentives to innovate and become efficient").
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1953," which provided large subsidies for certain industrial
activity."° But the result of this program was economic waste
and inefficiency."0 ' The incentive to the individual would-be
entrepreneur did not exist. This unfortunate story was mirrored
in the Chinese agricultural industry, 0 2 and both serve as
evidence of the fact that market orientation plays a crucial role
in a given market's incentives to innovate or adopt foreign
innovation.
Similarly, China's historical policy0 3 toward foreign trade
shows a lack of accessibility to foreign economic activity, which,
like China's market orientation, has negatively influenced the
economy's ability to keep up with foreign advances. Between
1949 and 1978, the Chinese economy was closed off from the
rest of the world.'" The gradual opening of the economy since
then has made up a great deal of ground.' But contrasted with
the fact that at no time in its history has the U.S. economy been
so isolated from foreign economic activity, China's years spent
removed from the international economy create a significant
handicap. In addition to China's historically less efficient
adoption of new technology, the nation's lack of exposure to
market conditions means fewer Chinese firms have evolved in
the demanding context of competition, where inefficient firms
99. Genevieve C. Dean, Science, Technology and Development: China as a "Case
Study" 51 CHINA Q. 520, 523 (1972).
100. For example, "people were encouraged to build furnaces all over the country
to produce iron and steel." Owen, supra note 2, at 127.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s, "'self-reliance' [was] a keynote to Chinese
policies for ten years." Dean, supra note 99, at 520.
104. Ewan Rose, Will China Allow Itself to Enter the New Economy?, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 451, 452 (2001). Looking even further back, China has had a long
history of isolation from the rest of the world:
China is one of the oldest nation-states in the world. For thousands of
years, China was ruled by successive dynasties. Long closed off to the rest
of the world, it was forced open by the British in the 1840 Opium War. It
became a republic for the first time in 1912. In 1949, after years of
fighting, communist forces ultimately defeated nationalist forces and took
control of the country. The new government, modeled after the Soviet
Union's, was called the People's Republic of China. Under the new
government, China was once again closed off from the rest of the world.
China finally began to open up again with the implementation of its recent
"open door" reforms.
Id. at 451-52 (internal citations omitted).
105. Since 1978 the GDP of China has risen tenfold. CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, supra note 11.
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are driven out of business. This efficiency gap alone presents
another challenge to Chinese firms.
In both absolute and relative terms, China's place within
the progression of globalization presents the country's
policymakers and private business owners with considerable
challenges as China joins the field of foreign competition.
2. Market Concentration and Segmentation
Another cause for worry about the ability of Chinese firms
to compete at the international level is the segmented nature of
its economy. As noted above, the Chinese economy is
characterized by low levels of geographic concentration and low
levels of intra-sector concentration,' °6 both a result of central
planning rather than economic force.' 7 This market structure
impedes competition for a number of reasons. One, the Maoist
idea of "local self-sufficiency"'0 8 meant a trade off: a defensive
military strategy at the expense of regional specialization. The
similarity in the local market structures throughout China
suggests that the country "has not taken advantage of the
benefits of regional specialization,"'0 9 which may be great as the
segmented "provinces have considerable capacity to exploit
regional comparative advantages.""'  Regional specialization
within a large economy such as China is beneficial from a
competitive standpoint because it allows regions to realize their
respective comparative advantages, thereby decreasing
production costs and increasing efficiency.
This "cellular""' market structure has also exacerbated the
dual problems of repetitive investment and a corresponding lack
of scale economies. Chinese policy-makers have noticed the
repetitive investments at low levels made by too many small
Chinese firms, resulting in what has been called "suicidal
competition.""' 2 Should a winner emerge from such competition,
106. Song, supra note 12, at 395-97. These levels are "low" relative to similar
industries in developed countries. Id. at 397.
107. Id. at 395.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 396.
110. Id. at 400.
111. Id. at 395 (referring to the specialization that existed at the provincial and
local levels in China, as opposed to specialization at a regional level).
112. Owen, supra note 2, at 132. The government has even taken measures
prohibiting such forms of competition that it considers harmful to the national
economy. Id.
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the victor may not be able to attain the sort of return its capital
would garner in a non-segmented national economy, and the full
potential benefits of scale economy production will not be
realized. Indeed, the Chinese government has noticed the
problem and has encouraged "enterprise groupings"--groupings
of large and medium-sized enterprises,"3  "to promote
interregional ... integration and achieve economies of scale[.]""' 4
The government has hoped that such groupings "will enable
Chinese enterprises to compete more effectively in international
markets.""5
Another layer in this segmented-market problem is the
existence of the "administrative monopoly," that is, the
government-created monopoly."6 Such entities attribute their
existence to different causes,"7 yet these monopolies "invariably
share two traits: First, they are empowered to carry out [some]
governmental function such as the allocation of [resources or]
the approval of infrastructural projects . . . . Second,
directorships of [such] companies are often held by incumbent
party or government officials" or otherwise politically connected
individuals, whose influence in the government has exploited to
gain economic benefits for their company." '  Administrative
monopolies at "provincial [or] local levels are well known for
creating and maintaining barriers to competition from other
localities[,]"' ' furthering the inefficient segmentation of the
national economy. "For example, many local governments force
dealers of beer, fertilizer, and medicines to only sell goods that
are produced within their own jurisdictions."'2 °
Such segmentation is a reasonable cause for worry for
Chinese officials considering the prospect of foreign firms
competing with those Chinese firms shaped by a segmented
marketplace. In fact, "[t]he Chinese government realized in the
early 1980s that low industrial concentration and market
113. Song, supra note 12, at 399.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 399-400.
116. Owen, supra note 2, at 130.
117. "Administrative monopolies are found mostly in three areas. First, in the
industries where government ministries have been converted to industrial
associations . . . .Second, in the sectors where the government has retained its
regulatory presence, and use such presence" to give "affiliate companies"
preferential treatment. Id. at 130. Third, governments at local levels which create
and maintain barriers to competition from other localities. Id. at 130-31.
118. Song, supra note 12, at 407.
119. Owen, supra note 2, at 130-31.
120. Id. at 131.
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segmentation across provinces were causing economic
inefficiency[,]" and has since "actively encouraged industrial
combinations of various types."
1 21
C. PROVISIONS OF THE AML EVINCING SUCH CONCERN
As noted earlier, a significant force behind the adoption of
the AML legislation was worry over the economic security of
China as foreign competition entered its markets.' 22  These
concerns have increased, understandably, since China's
accession to the WTO six years ago, after which China began to
enact rules designed to help local companies compete. 123 Certain
provisions of the AML, criticized by western commentators,
demonstrate this concern.
The AML outlines the policy objectives of the Act in Articles
1, 3, 8, 29, and 30.124 Western commentators have taken issue
with language indicating as policy goals of the Act such things
as protecting consumers, the national economy, the public
interest, and in some instances, business operators, claiming
that such objectives are not proper goals of antitrust regulation
because they do not lend themselves to economic analysis, and
reflect social and political goals best pursued via separate
legislation.2 5  The commentators advise that the proper
objective of antitrust regulation is to "promote competition," an
objective requiring, and amenable to, economic analysis. 26
Regarding "business operators" specifically, the
commentators lay out the conventional explanation for why it is
economically undesirable for a government to grant business
operators special consideration in the administration of
antitrust laws. 27 They reason that competition is a process that
121. Song, supra note 12, at 397. For example, the government has since
"promoted both mergers and enterprise groupings to create 'horizontal cooperation'
in the hope of breaking down the segmentation artificially imposed in the Maoist
era." Id. at 397-98.
122. China Passes New Anti-Trust Law, supra note 54.
123. Id. "The country increased control of foreign takeovers this year as Chinese
critics claimed overseas companies had gained dominance in some industries. China
has attracted over $300 billion in foreign investment since joining the WTO." Id.
124. ABA Comments 1, supra note 60, at 7 ("Articles 1 (Objectives), 3
('Monopoly'), 29 (Conditions for Disapproval), and 30 (Special Approval) of the
proposed law, together with the second part of article 8 (Prohibiting Monopoly
Agreements), contain provisions that outline the policy objective of the proposed
law.").
125. Id. at 9.
126. Id.
127. Id. "The consideration of rival business operators may reflect social and
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produces winners and losers, and that the experience in "the
[United States] and other countries with market economies and
established competition law regimes is that it is usually better
to permit the competitive process to occur unimpeded rather
than to favor some business operators over others, even when
some business operators may appear more deserving than
other."'28 This surely is an easier strategy to accept as a policy-
maker when the losing firms and employees do not
disproportionately outweigh the winners, as has been
characteristic of the U.S. experience. China's inclusion of such
objectives, while not antitrust goals properly considered,
evidences reasonable apprehension of a laissez-faire
marketplace complete with efficient foreign competitors.
Equally troublesome is the potential inter-industry
composition of winners and losers. The comparative advantage
of the United States has been, and continues to be, in the areas
of science and technology,'29 attributable in large part to
education. 3 ° China's comparative advantage, on the other hand,
has been in the area of cheap-labor.' Thus, in the United
States, the globalization "losers" have largely been in industries
which utilize unskilled or less skilled labor, such as the
manufacturing and textile industries, rather than high-tech and
knowledge-based industries utilizing a more educated labor
pool.
This experience invites the following question to the policy-
makers and commentators who supposedly favor letting the
market operate freely for the sake of an overall gain in economic
efficiency:"' is not the fact that the "winning" U.S. companies
tend to be in industries employing high-skill labor, while the
"losing" companies tend to be in industries employing low-skill
and inexpensive labor, also an influential piece in U.S.
competition policy?' 33 Understandably, China might not be so
political considerations that are not necessarily consistent or coherent with the
consumer welfare or efficiencies objectives." Id.
128. Id.
129. Stijepko Tokic, Examining the Big Picture Regarding the Importance of the
No Child Left Behind Act: Is It Worth Giving a Chance?, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
311, 318 (2007).
130. See id. (stating the relationship between education and science- and
technology-based industries).
131. Id.
132. The costs, of course, are concentrated disproportionately on a subset of the
general population.
133. See, e.g., Tokic, supra note 129, at 331 ("At the early stages of globalization,
economists claimed that the United States benefited from globalization because
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content with its own comparative advantage in cheap and
unskilled labor.'34
Further evidence of Chinese policy-makers' concern for the
possible negative effects of foreign competition can be found in
the AML's treatment of mergers and acquisitions by foreign
investors. Government review of these activities is warranted
for various non-economic reasons,3' but such reviews should be
done separately from antitrust reviews of such business
activities.'36 Prior to the AML, foreign merger and acquisition
activity in China was governed by the Provisional Rules for
Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign
Investors (Provisional Rules), the stated non-competition policy
goals of which include, among other things, securing
employment and maintaining the economic security of the
state. 7 The commentators have noted that the AML contains
certain duplicative and conflicting non-competition policy goals,
and have recommended that the AML deal only with
competition-related aspects of a proposed merger or acquisition,
and limiting the Provisional Rules to non-economic
considerations. 38  The inclusion of such redundant
considerations in the AML in the context of mergers and
acquisitions suggests the importance that China places on
ensuring that its domestic markets are not overwhelmed by
foreign companies.
139
higher-skilled, higher paid jobs remained in America, while labor intensive lower-
skilled jobs were moved to cheap labor countries, mostly China and India.").
134. See id., however, for a study of the current shift underway in national
comparative advantages as the Chinese workforce and the workforces of other
developing countries become more educated. This shift has led economic observers
to notice a "new trend in the American economy: increased global competition for
'white-collar' jobs that used to seem well-insulated and secure." Id.
135. For example, the Exon-Florio Act in the United States "applies national
security considerations to foreign investments in the [United States]." ABA
Comments 1, supra note 60, at 33. Likewise, Canada's Investment Canada Act
applies various non-competition policy considerations to foreign investments. Id.
136. Id. at 32-33 (explaining that a bifurcated approach avoids "the potential of
some transactions being required to satisfy the disparate competition policy
standards of two different laws").
137. Id. at 32.
138. Id.
139. Note, for example, the recent antitrust suit against Sony in the Chinese
courts. Parloff, supra note 59.
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III. HOW CHINA SHOULD PROCEED
Given the assumptions stated in Part II.A.,'" and in light of
its justifiable apprehension toward foreign competition, how
should China proceed? Chinese policy-makers recognize the
problems attendant to an economy without adequate antitrust
regulation.'4 ' They also realize, however, that for the vast
majority of China's small and medium-sized firms little if any
antitrust enforcement is necessary and may indeed be harmful
in the presence of foreign competition.'42 Further, the extent to
which China can benefit from outside advice'43 is debatable, as
the implementation of a competition policy will differ from
country to country because economic circumstances can vary
greatly."
Despite the threat that foreign competition may pose to
China's domestic firms, the American Bar Association (ABA)
commentators expound a legitimate countervailing
consideration in their explanation of why consumers benefit
when the competitive process is allowed to play out without
government interference.'45 The upshot of this consideration is
140. Again, those two assumptions are: 1) unrestricted international trade is
generally economically beneficial, and protectionist measures are likewise
economically harmful; and 2) domestic consolidation of separate business entities is
less of an antitrust concern where the marketplace of buyers and sellers is larger
than the national economy, and thus there are more firms, foreign and domestic, in
competition with each other.
141. Problems specific to China include abuse of administrative monopoly power
and acquisitions of domestic firms by multinational corporations. Owen, supra note
2, at 131.
142. Id. at 131-32.
143. As outlined in ABA Comments 2, supra note 60. See also ABA Comments 1,
supra note 60.
144. Song, supra note 12, at 394 (explaining, first, that "the emphasis of
antitrust law in a transitional economy should be to create a competitive market, a
goal notably different from the aim of maintaining an existing competitive
environment in established market economies," and second, that even between
transitional economies, the ideal competition policy will vary due to other economic
factors such as industrial concentration and structure). Consider also the following:
Competition policy is not shaped by economic theory alone. The goal,
scope, and nature of a country's competition policy is closely tied to the
underlying industrial organization and regulatory structure of the country,
and is to a large extent determined by the perception of the role of
competition by the country's political and economic culture. This is
particularly so in the case of China[.]
Owen, supra note 2, at 126.
145. ABA Comments 1, supra note 60, at 9 (explaining that competitive business
practices which damage other operators-Chinese firms in this case-benefit
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that erecting barriers to foreign firms, while providing
immediately enjoyed protection for Chinese firms, will in the
longer run work to hurt Chinese consumers.' 6 Protectionist
measures are equally harmful on the local and regional levels.
Decentralization 47 of the economy since 1978 has created the
problem of administrative monopolies abusing local
protectionist measures to gain economic benefit, in part by
creating larger tax bases from which to extract income.'48 As
noted above, "[r]egional protectionism has had a large effect on
the low degree of industrial concentration and the absence of
inter-regional competition."'49  Because there is a "huge
potential for inter-regional competition' 5 ° within China, the
removal of local trade barriers should be a key antitrust policy
goal for China, in addition to a goal of open international
competition.
A more viable alternative to enforcing protectionist
measures is to focus on fostering the competitiveness of Chinese
firms. The ABA commentators did not directly address this
alternative, although they were critical of the language of the
policy objectives, 5' which might serve as justification to treat
wholly domestic mergers and acquisitions more deferentially
than those involving a foreign firm as dominant party. The
commentators were correct in disapproving of the stated
purpose of the law as protecting, among other things, the
interests of "business operators" and the "national interest,"'52
insofar as such language includes non-competition
considerations beyond the appropriate reach of an antitrust law
consumers as a class because such competition provides consumers with lower
prices, and in the long run, creates incentives for other firms to increase their own
efficiency to cut costs, resulting in an overall more efficient market).
146. The negative effects will also be felt to a lesser extent by foreign consumers.
147. The Chinese model of gradual transition adopted a program of transferring
ownership and autonomy to provincial and local governments, thereby decreasing
the role of the central government entities in commanding the economy. Song,
supra note 12, at 405.
148. Id. (explaining that "[o]ne means of enlarging tax revenue is to prevent
local resources from moving to other provinces and barring the entry of products
from other provinces").
149. Id. at 406.
150. Id. at 410.
151. ABA Comments 1, supra note 60, at 8-9.
152. Specifically, the commentators take issue with such language as "protecting
the legal rights of business operators and consumers, and the public interest, and to
ensure the healthy development of the socialist market economy," 'the healthy
development of the national economy," and "damage the public interest." Id. at 8
(citing Articles 1 and 30, respectively).
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and confuses the analysis, especially given the coexistence of the
Provisional Rules.'53 However, insofar as such language could
be used as the statutory basis for differentiating between
merger or acquisition activities involving only domestic parties
and those involving at least one foreign party-in economic
terms familiar to antitrust analysis-an overall antitrust plan
may be appropriately designed to differentiate between two
classes of merger/acquisition activities and to provide differing
standards.
If there ever was a time and place to promulgate this type of
antitrust plan, it is in China today. The Chinese government
has been aware "that low industrial concentration and market
segmentation [has been] causing economic inefficienc[ies]" since
the early 1980s.'54  "It has promoted both mergers and
enterprise groupings to create 'horizontal cooperation' [to break]
down the segmentation . . . imposed during the Maoist era."'55
The Chinese government has exercised little merger control.'5 6
With the increasing presence of foreign competition in China's
uniquely vulnerable economy, the impetus for encouraging
domestic mergers rises as well, for two reasons. First, risk of
anticompetitive merger effects decreases as foreign competition
increases. The degree to which domestic consolidation of
market power will have anticompetitive effects depends on,
among other factors, 1 ' the share of the market commanded by
the merging firms. Foreign competition decreases this market
share. Second, foreign competition puts economic pressure on
less efficient domestic firms. An illustration of this phenomenon
153. See id. at 32.
154. Song, supra note 12, at 397.
155. Id. at 397-98.
156. Id. at 399.
157. Two other critical elements of market power, besides market share, at least
for the purposes of U.S. antitrust analysis, include 1) elasticity of demand and 2)
barriers to entry. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 394-95 (1956) (reasoning that in defining the relevant market, which in
turn is used to determine market power, consideration must be given to available
substitutes for the product at issue); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,
54-55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that barriers to market entry are an element of
market power); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425-26 (2d
Cir. 1945) (stating that "[tihere are indeed limits to [the monopolist's] power;
substitutes are available for almost all commodities, and to raise the price enough is
to evoke them"). The lower the elasticity of demand, the less consumers will respond
to higher prices by lowering consumption-gasoline is a prime example of an
inelastic product. The greater the barriers to entry, the more power a firm has to
charge price above costs, as it is more difficult for would-be entrants to enter the
market and drive down the price to the equilibrium value.
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in the United States is found in the proposed 1986 legislation
entitled "The Promoting Competition in Distressed Industries
Act," which would have relaxed restrictions on domestic mergers
where a sufficient degree of foreign competition was present.'58
The Act failed to pass and was roundly criticized-although
at least one critic saw problems in the details, rather than the
underlying economic theory. '59 Professor and former chairman
of the Federal Trade Commission Robert Pitofsky, in
commenting on the proposed piece of legislation, noted that in
theory at least, it is in the best interest of competition that a
given legal system allows the domestic industry to adjust
efficiently to import challenges, and furthermore that an
important instance of such adjustment to foreign competition
involves long-term supply contraction through consolidation or
cooperation." °  Short of implementing a distinct piece of
legislation along the lines of the Distressed Industries Act,
Chinese policymakers may utilize the broad scope of the AML's
stated objectives to promote the relative competitiveness of its
domestic firms without sacrificing the overall competitiveness of
its markets. This could protect both the consumer and business
interests of the country, and would do so without hurting
foreign business interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ABA's comments on the AML may be another example
of foreign imports which China finds difficult to embrace.
China's economic history is vastly different than that of the
United States and other western nations. Those differences are
just beginning to break down, and their effects are ever-preient
and ever-important. China still has to deal with the low levels
of industrial concentration and the high degree of market
segmentation which are the unnatural artifact of the Maoist
era, and it must do so within the demanding context of modern
globalization, which brings with it low transportation and
158. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 42, at 133 n.41. Such a relaxation of merger
restrictions would have occurred in lieu of import restrictions such as quotas and
tariffs. Id.
159. See generally Pitofsky, supra note 73.
160. Id. at 24. Specific details of the Act which Professor Pitofsky took issue
with included: an absolute exemption on merger activity once it was found that
foreign competition had caused distressed conditions, the fact that mergers are
permanent while foreign trade tends to fluctuate with exchange rates, and the lack
of political checks on the administration's power to grant exemptions. Id. at 26.
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communication costs, a great increase in the number of
multinational corporations, and the evolution of technology-
based immaterial products.
This situation is the reason for understandable
apprehension about allowing the global economy full reign
within China's markets; hence those aspects of the AML which
either allow for or require greater scrutiny of foreign merger and
acquisition activities. While this concern is justified to a certain
extent, protecting Chinese firms from the competition of
efficient foreign firms will only end up hurting Chinese
consumers. An alternative solution in administering the AML
in a way to dampen the harm foreign activity may inflict on
their Chinese counterpart is a continuation of a policy which the
Chinese have implemented since the early 1980s-the
encouragement of domestic enterprise consolidation. This can
be accomplished by applying a more lenient standard to
domestic consolidations than to mergers and acquisitions
involving foreign parties. The language of the AML's policy
objectives creates room for such a practice, and doing so would
not hinder foreign economic activity any more than if a single
strict standard were applied to all business consolidations. This
would accomplish the goal of fostering the competitiveness of
Chinese businesses while at the same time still serving the
traditional purpose of any antitrust law: protecting the
consumer interest.
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